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Economic assistance in the modern context is an aftermath of
World War II. Soon after the war, those in need of economic aid
were not what are referred to today as the less developed countries,
which were still colonies of the Western European powers - it was
war-torn Europe. There was only one possible source of assistance,
the United States which emerged from the war not only victorious,
but also economically strong. The United States, therefore, felt
obliged to offer immediate economic relief to Europe's devasted areas.
That was merely an emergency program. Europe's economic problems
were profound and needed a sustained program of economic assistance.
It became apparent that the two tasks of reconstruction and economic
development could not be successfully undertaken without large, out¬
side flows of capital. The United States, again, as the only possible
source of that needed capital, responded favorably by launching the
Marshall Plan in 1948.
The Marshal 1 Plan
While the launching of the Marshall Plan was a gesture of the
moral responsibility of a victor-nation towards the less fortunate,
it would be foolhardy to ever suppose that that was the main driving
force. To the United States, an economically strong Europe was a
pre-requisite for peace in Europe and in the whole world because
Europe would be impervious to Communist ideas, and would also be
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able to defend herself against any future armed attack from the
Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan was basically a vehicle of trans¬
mitting grants of capital funds from the United States to Europe
where they were employed to reconstruct the basic overhead capital
goods, i .e. communication systems, transport, irrigation, dams, etc,
and productive capital goods like factory buildings and other basic
industrial complexes. This was necessary before private capital
from the U. S. A. could be attracted into Europe to finance normal
productive activities.
Europe's response to the Marshall Plan was the formation, in
19^8, of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC),
which assumed the task of co-ordinating the capital funds allocation
to affected areas. It also aided in liberalizing trade among the
Western European states, a measure that expanded the goods markets,
and thus contributed to the accelerated recovery of Europe. The
Marshall Plan was a complete success. Europe's economic recovery
forestalled, as the Americans had anticipated, the rise of political¬
ly strong local groups sympathetic to Communist ideas; and also
Europe became an important market for American private investments.
A note of caution, the success story of the Marshall Plan is
that of a reconstruction effort as distinct from a development pro¬
gram. It was not concerned with the task of changing the political
and social attitudes inimical to development. It was merely a
problem of rebuilding the economic structure that had been shattered
by the war. A grasp of this salient point is necessary before one
can appreciate the difficult task of employing economic aid to induce
economic development in the less developed countries.
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United States Economic Assistance to the
Less Developed Countries
The United States' participation in any form of economic
assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the World can be traced
back to the late 1930's and early 19^0's when she extended develop¬
ment loans to a few countries in Latin America. This was in pursuit
of the "Good Neighbor Policy," initiated during Franklin 0. Roosevelt's
first administration.^ Except for this limited involvement, the
United States, prior to World War II, maintained an isolationist
attitude towards the problems of the less developed areas. Her
excuse was that she could not afford the expense involved. What she
might have been saying was that the lack of development in those
areas was no threat to world peace. World War I il and its after effects,
the Cold War between the eastern and western blocs, induced a slight
shift in her policy.
The United States' economic assistance program, though still
of a limited nature, was initiated by President Truman's inaugural
address in January, 19^9. Point number four was that the United
States investigate the feasibility of establishing a program of
technical assistance to the underdeveloped areas. The reason was
that it would encourage a flow of private capital into those areas,
economic development would follow as a matter of course. The capital
referred to was American.
^Raymond F. Mikesell,The Economics of Foreign Aid. (Chicago:
The Aldine Publishing Company, I96S) pp*
4
The other three points, respectively, were; support for the
United Nations and the Marshall Plan, and the need for NATO (the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization).'
The enthusiastic public support for the suggested technical
assistance scheme impelled the government to launch the so-called
Point-Four Program without further delay. The support for the
program stemmed from two sources: first, it was moral responsibility
enhancing, "magnanimous in concept," yet of temporary duration, and
secondly, it was going to be inexpensive in operation. When the
Point Four bill was presented to the Congress, it was accompanied
by another bill, the Export-Import Bank which was to handle the
export credits to be given to the under-developed countries.
The Point Four program was important, not so much because of
what it achieved as a program, but because it got the United States
involved, in principle, in the economic assistance effort. Once
initiated into the economic assistance field, it was a matter of
time before the United States found herself deeply involved. The
second step toward complete involvement came after the Korean War
of 1950. Her experience with Communist tactics of aggresion in
the Far East made her assume a global role of fighting Communist
aggression where-ever it showed its "ugly face." Armed with the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, she was able to offer economic assist¬
ance to countries in the Far East, Middle East, and Africa, which
were willing to unite in fighting the Communists or at least
^Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid; Policies,
Problems, and Possibilities. (New York; Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 196?) pp. 42-43.
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willing to accept her military bases. "Turkey, which offered large
ground forces and bases near Russia, as well as troops to fight the
Korean War, was in a favored position."^ The United States also
granted economic assistance where money seemed capable of alleviat¬
ing international crises as in the case of Iran after the fall of
Mossadegh, Jordan after a crisis over the joining of the Bahdad
Port forced British withdrawal and aroused fear for Israel's
security, Guatemala after a Communist-oriented regime had been over¬
thrown, and Panama when the political instability there threatened
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the security of the canal. However, despite this apparent in¬
volvement in the underdeveloped areas, the United States had not,
at this stage, undertaken the task of "building viable and progres¬
sive societies throughout the less developed world." Her commit¬
ments were still limited to the Point Four Program.
But her policy changed after 195^ in response to what she
called the "Sino-Soviet economic offensive," a Communist policy of
undermining Western influence in the less developed world through
economic assistance as opposed to instigation of armed revolutions.
This Communist strategy was very opportune because at that very
time, young economically backward states were gaining their politi¬
cal independence from western colonial powers. It became the
business of the United States to fight the Communists on the
economic front through a program of assistance designed to build
economically viable states. And she was confident, spurred on by
* Ibid., p. 45.
^Ibid.
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the success cf the Marshall Plan, that improving the economic con¬
ditions in the less developed world would be successful in keeping
them on the side of the Western World. Of course, the United States
aid officials were aware that the economic success of the Marshall
Plan was largely due to the fact that the United States merely
supplied the only missing component, capital funds. That in the
underdeveloped countries the task would be more difficult because
what was needed, in addition to capital funds, was the transformation
of the populations skills, and attitudes. Nevertheless, the Marshall
Plan served a propaganda role in amassing public support for the
economic development program, as we know it today, which started in
the period 1956-1960; its peculiar nature was that it was a global
commitment to alleviating the economic plight of the "have nots" in
the underdeveloped world. This explains the extensive character of
U. S. A. aid even today.
European Aid to the Less Developed Countries
The historical background of Europe's aid to the less developed
countries is different from that of the United States. The major
European powers did not get themselves involved in the Cold War con¬
frontation with the Communist bloc on a global basis as did the United
States. They were concerned, first, with their own prosperity and
security, and secondly, they extended that same concern only to their
colonies or dependents. Even if they had wanted to get committed in
the Cold War global confrontation, the expense involved could have
been prohibitive.
The economic success of the Marshall Plan's aid to Europe had
favorable spillover effects onto the colonies and dependents. The
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European powers became capable of giving more aid to the colonies.
Also the economic value of colonies to economically strong mother
countries diminished. This development accelerated the trend that
was taking shape prior to the Second World War, The trend was,
"the nineteenth-century attitude of regarding colonies as mainly
sources of national economic gain or of military advantage had been
giving way to attitudes of responsibility for the well-being of
dependents, and to the concept of a community of cultural, economic,
and political interests under the leadership of the metropolitan
, 1country.
The results of the accelerated trend were the granting of
political independence by the European powers, to their colonies
in the post-war era, and the formation of associations or communities
under the leadership of the mother country. The British Commonwealth
of Nations and the French Community are good examples. The granting
of political independence to even remotely qualified colonies or
dependents, in terms of economic viability and/or administrative
organization,meant that the former colonial powers had to embark on
programs of economic and technical assistance in order to forestall
the collapse of the national states. This an obligation the colonial
western powers had to shoulder in order to establish the genuineness
of their intentions for granting political independence.
International Assistance
After the United States had taken over, under the Marshall
Plan, the responsibility for the reconstruction of Europe, the
^Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, p.4.
8
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
which had been especially established for the economic rebuilding
of Europe, turned to development assistance, even to the less de¬
veloped areas. The European task had proved beyond its limited
resources. But the World Bank (IBRD) found most underdeveloped
countries unable to meet its stringent loan terms, and there was
also a dearth of sound investment projects. The discovery of these
facts was beneficial in that it brought to the attention of the
international community the need for development capital, on easy
terms, in the less developed countries. The recognition of that
need expressed itself in the establishment of the International
Development Association (IDA) in I960, an affiliate of the World
Bank. Its operations involve granting of interest free loans to
less developed countries, the only cost is the $.75 per cent
service charge.
The other evidence of concern by the international community
about the economic plight of the less developed countries was the
formation, in 1962, of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). It was based on the Organization for
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which the members felt had
been rendered unnecessary after the success of the Marshall Plan.
In fact, it is more accurate to say that it was a mere re-naming
and re-organization of the OEEC. The new organization was
strengthened by the inclusion of the U. S. and Canada. But, it was
not until 1963 that the OECD concentrated its activities on granting
economic assistance (public) to countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Its first major effort was directed toward providing
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technical assistance to Greece, Ireland, Spain, Turkey, and Yugosla¬
via, the first four of which were continuing members of the OEEC.
The economic Assistance from the members of the OECD to the less
developed countries has remained, spurred on by the co-ordinating
activities of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the pillar
of the whole economic assistance program for a long time (see Table
5).
Communist Assistance
The Communists became involved in economic assistance as we
know it today in the period beginning in 195^* It was a result of
the change of tactics of attack on western institutions, from open
promotion of revolution or even open aggression by the Communists
themselves to attack on the economic front. It could be (change of
policy) attributed to the failure of their former policy in Europe
and in the Far East (the Korean War, 1950).
The purpose of the Communist aid has never been concealed, the
maximization of immediate political gains, a policy that has been
regarded in the West as the "Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive." Apart
from its propaganda value, which should never be minimized because
it has impelled the Western powers to, perhaps, to give more aid than
they would have. Quantitatively, it has remained modest, yet always
increasing.
It was necessary, too, because the western powers wanted to
retain the friendship of their former colonies, especially after the
"Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive" became operational. The Communists
would only have been too glad to step in to help those they publicly
regarded to have been exploited by their former colonial masters.
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This commitment of the ex-colonial powers toward the betterment of
the economic conditions of their former colonies explains the reason
why, to date, the bulk of British and French aid flows to the less
developed countries which were once under their sovereignty.
Unlike the United States the colonial powers, Britain and
France, became involved in economic assistance on a long term basis.
They never adopted the notion of a "terminal-date" for aid as did
the U. S. A. The reason was that they were not compelled to justify
their reason for engaging in foreign aid, since they were only help¬
ing members of their own community. As a consequence, continued
eligibility to economic assistance depended on continued membership
to the family association. The French have been more rigid in this
respect as was demonstrated by total withdrawal of aid to Guinea
after she refused to toe the French line. In this aid policy of the
ex-colonial powers, one sees political, cultural, economic, and
humanitarian objectives merged with a feeling of mutual interest based
on a long association. For the other European non colonial powers,
including West Germany that lost its colonies during the war, the
involvement in economic aid to the less developed countries has been
based on two main reasons: disinterested humanitarianism and self
economic interests
CHAPTER II
THE RATIONALE FOR GRANTING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
In broad terms, economic aid may be defined as the transfer
of goods and services from the more developed countries to the less
developed countries, regardless of purpose. The logical basis of
such a definition lies in the fact that such transfers (foreign)
augment local resources. They finance ventures - whether of war or
civil type - which might have either been impossible to undertake,
for lack of funds, or might have diverted local resources from
other uses. This definition ignores the outflow of resources from
the less developed countries in the form of loan repayments with
interest charges, and profits from foreign financed investments
activities. So that the benefit from the inflows of capital may be
more than compensated for by capital outflows. This is more than
likely where the bulk of foreign capital inflow is made up of private
capital in the form of high interest loans and private investments.
The narrower definition of economic aid focuses on the subsidy
element and purpose of foreign transfers of goods and services.
Included in this definition are: outright grants of goods and services,
i.e. capital funds and commodities; interest-free loans from the World
Bank (IBRD) itself or governmental bodies or other international,
multilateral organizations granted at less than prevailing commer¬
cial interest rates. Those transfers excluded are: military assist¬
ance, and private or public loans at commercial interest rates.
including transfers under export-import credit arrangements. In
practice, however, this distinction may not be important in terms
of what type contributes to economic development. Aid designated
as development assistance, may not always serve that purpose. For
instance, military personnel who construct bridges and roads or other
structures contribute more to productive capacity than partial use
of investment funds for increased consumption or destructive military
expenditures. Nevertheless, this short study will be mainly con¬
cerned with the narrowly defined economic assistance.
The rationale for economic aid to the less developed areas
may be difficult to discern especially where donors have either
hidden or undeclared objectives or do not even know why they are
giving aid. Perhaps one of the clearest manifestations of the true-
basis (interest of donors) - of economic assistance has been the
continual predominance, amid strong criticism, of bi1aterialism,that
is, the aid process between one donor and one recipient country or a
group of recipients under a representative body. There must be some¬
thing more in aid-giving than the developed countries' compassion for
the economic plight of the less developed areas. Raymond F. Mikesell
has identified, with reference to Western World donors in general and
the United States in particular, three main objectives; (1) the donor
national security or political interests, (2) the humanitarian reasons,
i.e. legitimate concern over the plight of the poor nations, and
(3) the national economic benefits of the donor countries.^
^Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 6-15.
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National Security Interests
The Western World, i.e. the non-Communist aid-donors, includ¬
ing Japan, gives economic assistance to the less developed countries,
basically, because of the belief that economic development will make
them less susceptible to world Communism. In areas where Communism
already has considerable influence, aid is given to buy the neutrality
of those nations. Communism, with its attack on private property,
is regarded as threat number one to the capitalistic institutions of
the Western World. In this report economic aid symbolizes an
idealogical wrangle between the eastern and western blocs. The
interests of the recipients are of secondary importance, a fact that
is scarcely explicitly expressed by the donors in the respective
camps. Some critics have argued that economic assistance, in pursuit
of political gains like buying the goodwill of aid-recipients,
should not be classified as economic aid, defined in the narrow sense.
The basis of the argument is that the donors receive full benefit,
where they succeed, for their money. And that the fact that goodwill
is an intangible commodity should not cloud the main issue. This
is an excellent intellectual distinction but, in practice, it is very
difficult to distinguish this type of aid from those in furtherance
of humanitarian objectives.
The political interests of donors account for the predominance
of bilateral arrangements in the aid system. As already outlined in
Chapter I, it was the political repercussions of the Cold War that
indirectly influenced the United States' adoption of President Truman's
Point Four Program. Secondly, it was the political and security con¬
sequences of the Communist attack of South Korea that made the
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United States employ economic assistance either as a means of buying
acceptance from local people for her military bases or of building
up weak governments in underdeveloped areas, which were sympathetic
to Western ideology. What was significantly novel about the military
activities, which were authorized by the Mutual Security Act, 1954,
was that they were global in nature. Thus, the United States for the
first time, accepted the responsibility of using her economic and
military strength to police the world against any Communist threat.
However, one salient point that must be grasped is that the United
States had not endorsed the principle of giving capital development
funds to the underdeveloped countries. She still emphasized technical
aid under the Point Four Program.
It was the need to counteract the political gains of the "Sino-
Soviet Economic Offensive" that got the United States into the capital-
aid program. The struggle for the goodwill of these underdeveloped
areas intensified as colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
gained political independence from Western European powers. It was
the fear that the new independent states might discard the Western
political system and accept Communist idealogy - more so with Russia
doing good salesmanship - that made the ex-colonial powers embark
on economic aid programs. The favorable impact of the Western World
economic counter offensive was, ironically, acknowledged by Soviet
Premier Nikita Krushchev when he said: "This aid which the capitalist
countries are planning to extend to the states which have recently
won independence should also be viewed as part of Soviet Aid to these
states. If the Soviet Union did not exist, it is likely that the
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monopolies of the imperialist powers would aid the underdeveloped
countries? Of course not."^
Furthermore, the question of aid competition between the eastern
and western blocs may be further explained by reference to Leo Tansky's
table of United States and Soviet Union Aid figures for twenty-one
less developed countries, (see Table 1 - next page)
V. Rymlov, "Economic Competition of the Two Systems and the
Problems of Aid to Under-developed Countries," Problems of Economics
III (Moscow: December, I960) p. 45, as reproduced in Leo Tansky,
U. S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries; A Complete Study of
India, Turkey, and U.A.R. (United Arab Republic) (New York,Washing¬
ton, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 196/) p.15.
TABLE 1
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED TO THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, JULY, 1945 - JUNE, I965'
U.S. Economic Aid (In Millions of U.S. Dollars) U.S.S.R. Economic Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
July, 1945 - Percent July, 1954 - Percent July, 1954 - Percent
June, 1965 of Total June, I965 of Total June, I965 of Total
Total to all Countries























































































Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants; U. S. Department of State, Research Memorandum RSB-65,
"The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1964," August 4, 1965 (Mimeographed); Middle East Economic
Pigest, January 21, 1966; New York Times, February 25, 1965.
*Less than .5 percent.
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In Table 1, columns 1, 2, 3> and 4 shovv figures and percentage
of U. S. aid; columns 2 and 4 are my own calculations from Leo
Tansky's figures; columns 5 and 6 show figures and percentages of
U. S. S. R. for the period July, 1954-June, 1965. The table also
shows that all U. S. S. R. economic aid goes to selected countries
as opposed to thinly spread U. S. aid. The trend in U. S. aid seems
to be gradually turning toward concentration in few selected countries
(46.3 percent for the period 1954-65 as against 43.8 percent in the
1945-65 period). The total U. S. economic aid, for the comparable
period, is seven times that of the U. S. S. R. An examination of
columns 2 and 4 indicates that U. S. aid percentages to individual
countries were higher in the period July, 1954 - June, 1965 than
in the period July, 1945 - June, I965, except for four countries,
Argentina, Burma, Greece, and Indonesia; Burma had the same percentage
in both periods and the other had higher percentages in the period
covering the late forties and early fifties. Except for Greece whose
position may be explained by the probable favorable impact of the
Marshall Plan which began in 1948, I cannot explain the positions
of the other three.
The higher percentages of U. S. economic aid for the period
July, 1954 - June, 1965, are explainable by the response to the "Sino-
Soviet Economic Offensive" which is confirmed by a comparison of per¬
centages in columns 4 and 6. If we exclude, in column 4, all the
percentages less than .5 per cent (*), the U. S. S. R, percentage
figures are higher than the U. S.'s except for four countries; Cam¬
bodia, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey. This evidence, though by no
means conclusive, may be used in support of the thesis that an
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increase in U. S. percentages in the period July, 195^ - June, 1965
illustrates an endeavor to catch up with the Communists.
What is apparent is that political objectives are the corner¬
stone of bi-1ateralism in the aid-giving process. It is immaterial
whether the donor belongs to the western camp or the Communist bloc.
The only difference between the two groups of donors is that the
former have been more diplomatic and have come to be open in special
cases. For example, the United States suspended its aid to Pakistan
in mid-1965, despite the success Pakistan was having with her de¬
velopment program, because of that country's leanings toward
Communist China.^ For the latter, their political intentions have
been more than open. To them no system other than the bi-lateral
makes sense. They have continually refused to participate in inter¬
nationally constituted aid-giving agencies-(in I965, they refused
to participate in the Asian Development Bank). They have selectively
used their aid for direct political gains (see Table 1). They have
stepped in to help countries already denied economic assistance by
the Western nations. And they have granted loans on relatively low
rates of interest to make them more attractive, i.e. 2.5 percent as
opposed to between 3«5 and 6 percent in the West. Classical
examples of the Communist approach are: the paving of the streets
of Kabul after the Americans had dismissed the venture as non-con-
tributary to economic development, and the building of the Aswan Dam
in Egypt after the British and International organizations had
^Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid; Policies,
Problems and Possibilities^ (New York, Washington, London: Frederick
A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 102.
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withdrawn their support for the scheme. However, whether this
Communist approach has paid off politically is an interesting
question.
Humanitarianism
The humanitarian objective which may be termed aid for de¬
velopment is in most cases inseparable, as already stated above,
from the political one. Economic assistance programs are usually
supported either implicitly or explicitly for a combination of the
two. To find an example of the latter, one need only to turn to
the United States Presidents' Foreign Aid messages to get the
answer. For instance. President Johnson, in his January 14, 1965
Foreign Aid message to the Congress, had this to say (not very
different from that of President Kennedy): "For our own security
and well-being, and as responsible free men, we must seek to share
our capacity for growth, and the promise of a better life, with
our fellow men around the world. That is what foreign aid is
about!"^ Speeches of similar tone are not infrequently delivered
by British or French governmental officials. The only difference
being that the colonial powers, of which Britain and France are
representatives, tend to limit the scope of their operations to their
dependencies or former colonies; the United States programme is
global in scope.
The Communists, too, apply the same technique while their
main objective is to further their political ideology. They will
^New York Times, January 15, 1966, p. 12 As Reproduced in
Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, p. 6.
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tell the less developed nations that they are interested only in
saving them from exploitation by the international capitalists. They
promise them a road to economic development that is cheap, and of
unlimited potentialities.
The salient point in this dual-natured aid policy is that if
the humanitarian sentiment were paramount in importance, one would
expect donors to give aid to less developed countries according to
the degree of poverty expressed in the smallness of their per capita
incomes. Little and Clifford in International Aid, p. 66, after an
analysis of the aid fitures for 1962 and 1963* by principal re¬
cipients, from annual publications of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), were unable to confirm that point. The follow¬
ing table they made for twenty-four countries and two French over¬
seas areas, (see next page)
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TABLE 2
PRINCIPAL RECIPIENTS OF AID FROM OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES AND MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS,


























seas Oepts . 17 98 1 17.0 98.0
Israel 31 93 2 940 15.5 46.5
Jordan 3 75 2 200 1.5 37.5
Algeria 23 321 1 1 281 2.1 29.2
S.Viet Nam 3 196 15 94 0.2 13.1
Tunisia 16 44 4 175 4.0 11.0
Liberia 48 9 1 133 48.0 9.0




108 320 40 81 2.7 8.0
Congo (Leo¬
poldville) -5 96 15 88 -0.3 6.4
Turkey 35 190 30 209 1.2 6.3
Yugoslavia 65 112 19 -- 3.4 5.9
Egypt 39 158 28 123 1.4 5.7
Formosa 8 67 12 154 0.7 5.6
Kenya 15 38 9 85 1.7 4.2
Morocco 33 41 13 164 2.5 3.2
PakiStan 166 284 99 78 1.5 2.9
Chile 124 19 8 445 15.5 2.4
Venezuela 54 16 8 726 6.6 2.2
Colombia 66 25 15 274 4.4 1.7
Thai 1 and 19 32 29 100 0.7 1.1
Brazi1 105 86 78 187 1.4 1.1
Indonesia 19 98 100 85 0.2 1 .0
India 434 428 459 81 0.9 0.9
Mexico 57 11 38 319 1.5 0.3
Argentina 86 5 22 451 3.9 .03
1. Plus $31 million in French grants not broken down as be-
tween these two countries.
2. OECD is composed of most of the developed countries of
Western Europe, the U.S.,Canda,and Japan. DAC is an aid
Co-ordinating agent of OECD members.
Sources: Development Assistance Committee, "Efforts and Poli-
sies," pp.44-45, and Organization for Economic Co¬
operation and Development,FIow of Financial Resources.
^I.M.D. Little and Clifford, J.M.,International Aid (Chicago:
A1 dine Puhl i^hinxi ComDanv. 1966) d.66.
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In Table 2, column (2) shows net lending; column (3) shows total
grants and other grant-like contributions; column (4) population in
millions; column (5) pei* capita Gross National Product in dollars for
1962; column (6) loans per capita in dollars, and column (7) grants
for each head in dollars. The twenty-four countries accounted for
62 percent of aid from the OECD. To test whether a high ratio of per
capita grants was associated with a low gross national product per
capita, the countries were arranged according to grants per head. As
can be seen from the table, this is not the case. There is also no
association between low per capita GNP and large grants as would one
expect. The two men (Little and Clifford) found statistical relation¬
ship between low per capita Gross National Product and grants per
capita. However, they found a positive correlation between aid and
wealth (high Gross National Product per capita). But, they found
out that there was bias due to Israel's inclusion - Israel's GNP
per capita is inflated by reparation receipts from Germany; with
Israel excluded the correlation was negligible.
From this exercise. Little and Clifford concluded that the
figures could not be explained by reference to per capita Gross
National Product a measure, though not perfect, of the relative pover¬
ty of the less developed areas. After making qualifications for
rsrae1"« low figure as a result of reparation payments from West
Germany ($70 M out of $90 million grant total), the two men endorsed
the view that economic and political objectives tend to prevail over
humanitarianism. Their conclusion was put this way: that given a
country is regarded by the Western World as "developing" and that it
is not attached to Moscow or Peking, there were (on the basis of the
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table) three alternative ways in which it could qualify for a large
amount of grant per capita; (1) that it should be closely associated
with France as either an overseas dependency or as a member of the
France area; (2) that it should have a common border with any one
of the Communist countries, or be regarded by the Americans as being
on the verge of a Communist take-over, or host American military
bases; and (3) that it should have some newly discovered business
community like Algeria and Liberia.^
However, the three countries: Egypt, Israel, and Jordan are
not covered by the three point explanation. But the reasons for
the relatively high grants per capita for those countries are found
in the national security and political sphere. Jordan's economic
strength is regarded by the West, particularly the U. S. and U. K.,
as vital for peace in the Middle East. The U. S. and U. K. have a
responsibility for the survival of Israel, a state that helped to
create. Egypt was, before its positive leaning toward the Soviets,
a good example of East-Vi/est competition in the aid-giving business.
Furthermore, Alan Strout, on a different study of the OAC's
aid figures for 1960-62 in a way, arrived a a similar conclusion as
to the negligible influence of low per capita income as a basis for
aid eligibility. His study showed that the range of $100-300 per
capita income aid per head was $2.40, while below $100 per capita aid
2
was only $1.48, and above $300, it was $1.31* Alan Stout was quick
to qualify the conclusion of his study; that the position of the low
^Ibid., p. 68.
2
Alan M. Strout, "Factors Affecting the Allocation of Foreign
Economic Aid," Agency for International Development, 1964 As Quoted
in Little and Clifford, International Aid, p"! 9^.
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per capita income countries was not as desperate as figures indicated
because (with India excluded) they benefit from the"sma11 country,"
effect.
The Alan Strout and Little-Clifford arguments on the low per
capita income as a criterion for allocating economic aid are sound,
to say the least, but one may discredit them on the grounds that
they might be a bit out-of-date. To answer that charge, I will refer
to the United States economic aid figures for the fiscal years
1965 and 1968. Any trend depicted by United States figures should
be significant for Western countries economic assistance because
the U. S. contributes by far the largest absolute amount (far above
the combined figure from the other western donors). For instance,
in the fiscal year 1965> her aid was 62.4 percent of the total from
the main OECD contributors, in l568, though lower, was well over
half.^ The following is a table showing how loans and grants from
the United States aid agencies were distributed to the same less
developed countries as those covered by the Litt 1 e-Clifford study:
(See next page).
Calculated from OECD figures as Reproduced by Asher, Robert
E., "Foreign Aid: The Post War Record and Targets for the 1970's.'
Monthly Labor Review, November, I969 (U. S. Department of Labor,
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Jordan 1.6 38.0 2 200 .8 19.0
S. Vietnam •if-Jrk 216.1 15 94 >> 14.4
Liberia 9.3 5.9 1 133 9.3 5.9
S. Korea?. 47.9 70.7 27 83 1.7 2.6
Thai 1 and 20.6 18.3 29 100 .71 .631
Kenya .6 3.4 9 85 . 066 .377
Chile 96.6 2.5 8 445 12.075 .3125
Tunisia 16.8 1.1 4 175 4.2 .275
Colombia (-*) 3.7 1.5 274 (-VO .247
Venuezue1 a -- 1.6 8 726 .200
Brazil 218.4 12.4 78 187 2.8 .1589
Turkey 146.1 3.8 30 209 4.87 .127
Egypt -- 2.2 28 123 -- .078
PakiStan 175.3 7.1 99 78 1.707 .0717
Argentina -17.8 1.5 22 451 .081 .068
Morocco 8.8 .8 13 164 .762 .062
A1geria -- .6 1 1 281 .054
Congo 15 .8 15 88 1.0 .05
India 255.8 8.8 459 81 .557 .019
MexiCO 24. 38 319 .645 .011
Formosa -5.5 -.3 12 154 -.458 -.025
Indonesia -2.4 -3.9 100 85 -.024 -.039
Yugoslavia -.3 -.1 19 -- .. .005
Israel 20.0 (-*) 2 940 10.0 (-*)
*Less than $50,000
Source; Agency for International Development, "Proposed
Economic Assistance Programs Financial Year, 1967; Summary Presenta¬
tion to the Congress, pp. 223-225. Table No. 1 - For the loan and
grant figures; other figures as in Table 2.
In Table 3> the main assumption made is that the populations and
gross national products remain unchanged - a rather unrealistic assump¬
tion, yet adopted for the sake of simplicity. So that columns 4 and
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5 are the same as in Table 2; column 2 is net lending; column 3 grants;
column 6 loans per capita, and column 7 grants per capita. Leaving
out the French overseas dependencies, the countries are arranged in
the order of the magnitude of grants per capita, as in the Little-
C1ifford Case.
The results are as follows; Israel drops from first position
to last; Algeria from third to seventeenth; Tunisia from fifth to
eighth; Congo (Leopoldville) from eighth to eighteenth; Turkey from
ninth to twelfth; Yugoslavia from tenth to twenty-third and Morocco
from fourteenth to sixteenth. Thailand moves from nineteenth position
to fifth; Kenya from thirteenth to sixth; Chile from sixteenth to
seventh; Venezuela from seventeenth to tenth; Colombia from eighteenth
to ninth; Brazil from twentieth to eleventh; Mexico from twenty-third
to twentieth; Argentina from twenty-fourth to fifteenth, and India
twenty-second to nineteenth. The other countries: Jordan, South
Vietnam, and Liberia move from high to higher positions; Pakistan
moves up one step and Indonesia down one step.
The next question is: what meaning should be attached to these
results? On the whole, the Litt1e-Clifford thesis has been supported,
to say the least. First, all the French-related countries have been
degraded. This can be read as a negative indication of the magnitude
of French aid, which is not included in Table 3« Second, with the
exception of Formosa and Israel, all the countries regarded as im¬
portant for the United State's political and security interests, in¬
cluding India and South America, moved to higher positions; the
priority given to Jordan, South Korea and South Viet Nam is significant
the position of Egypt might be indicative of her positive leanings
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toward the Communist World so that the United States regards it as
a lost cause. That of Turkey might signify the lessening of Communist
pressure there. The case of Formosa and Israel are explanable by
the fact that the two no longer needed grant-aid because of the
success of the economic development efforts. This is in tune with
Alan Strout's findings. And finally, the upgrading of Liberia to
third class might have a lot to do with the discovery of mineral de¬
posits. Nevertheless, it might be advisable not to read too much
meaning into these results. First, because of the probable bias
resulting from the assumption of constant population and gross
national product per capita, and second, because no statistical tests
have been attempted.
Regardless of the last sentence of the previous paragraph,
the distribution of the United States economic aid for the fiscal
year 1968 replenishes somewhat the strength of the Little-Clifford
"conclusion." Under the policy of concentrating assistance on a
few recipient countries, fifteen shared about ninety percent of
the total, 3>3^7 million dollars in I968. The comitments by order
of magnitude were as follows: South Vietnam claimed the largest
at $400 million; then India ($301 million); Brazil ($194 million);
Pakistan ($132 million); Colombia ($77 million); South Korea ($75
million); Turkey ($72 million); Laos, Chile, Thailand, Dominican
Republic, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Panama.^ The very
choice of the list of recipients on which to give more aid smacks of
^Robert E. Asher, "Foreign Aid: the Post War Record and
Targets for the 1970's." Monthly Labor Review, November, I969,
(U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics) pp. 25-30.
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political and security interests, let alone the magnitude of
individual commitments. The amounts of aid to South Vietnam, South
Korea, Laos and Thailand indicate that that area ranks number one in
priority; the amounts to India and Pakistan might be a reflection
of the restoration of aid in 1966, after its withdrawal because of
the Indo-PakiStan War (partly related to Pakistan's positive leaning,
then, to Communist countries); the commitments to Latin American
countries show that that continent has assumed second place in the
order of priority, pushing Europe to third place (with Turkey's
$72 million). The selection of Indonesia reflects a renewed interest
in that country after the fall of Communist-oriented Sukharno; and
finally, interest in Nigeria might stem from the fear of Communist
influence, in one of the largest countries in Africa, after military
takeover in 1966, with its Communist sympathies.
Economic Interests of Donors
In their endeavor to aid the less developed countries, given
the other two objectives already dealt with, the more developed
countries have not disregarded their own national economic interests.
Even the Communist countries, which have always posed as the only
"honest" friends of the less developed countries, have had to bow
to their own economic interests. First, to ensure that their
foreign exchange and gold reserves are not unduly drained, the
donors have embarked on a system of aid-"tying." That is, instead
of crediting to the foreign reserve accounts of recipients foreign
exchange to the value of the loan, they have required that the loan
be used to buy their own (donors') goods. This has virtually
amounted to giving the recipient countries goods at whatever cost.
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instead of funds with which to purchase goods from markets of their
own choice at world competitive prices. The ramifications of this
problem of aid-"tying" will be pursued in more detail in Chapter 3
where the disadvantages of "project" oriented aid will be considered.
I must, however, hasten to add that aid-"tying" per se is not a
mark of the inconsiderate economic selfishness of donors. For a
country faced with a continual balance of payments deficits, it may
be a lesser of the two evils, the other being curtailment of aid
commitments. In such a case, the technique is in the best interests
of both donor and recipient. For example, the United States was
able to increase its aid to less developed countries between 1958
and 1962 despite payments deficits. But when a country like West
Germany which has to revalue its currency, embarks on aid-"tying,"
the charge is more than appropriate.
Secondly, the economic interests of donors are expressed in
the form of high interest for loans extended to the less developed
countries. Such loans can rightly be regarded as no aid at all,
since interest rates are at commercial levels. The subsidy element
is ipso facto lacking. Another crucial point about high interest
rates on development loans is that they help to create "debt-serving"
problems in the recipient countries, i.e. they increase the possibili¬
ty of the recipient's failure to meet their commitments when loans
are due. This eventuality becomes a restriction on the acquisition
of future loans because it leads to frequent rescheduling of payment
dates and thus impaires their credit-worthiness. A British White
Paper on a plea for softer-development loans had this to say:
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It has gradually come to be recognized that many
developing countries cannot pay interests at market
rates, repay capital, and at the same time, maintain an
adequate rate of development. They are faced with an
increasing burden of debt, which pre-empts a larger and
larger amount of their earnings of foreign exchange.
Thirdly, while donors, i.e. Germany, Canada, have reacted favorably
by reducing (except the United States which increased its public
loan interest rates from .75 percent to 2.5 percent), interest rates
of public loans to developing countries, they have, in pursuit of
their economic interests, added to the debt-burden of the recipients
from another angle.
Some governments have embarked on a policy of encouraging
private investments, by their nationals, in the less developed
countries. In the United States, which has vigorously followed that
policy since 1962,^ the Export-Import Bank executes that policy
through guaranteeing export credits, particularly to Latin America;
in West Germany, the Development Loan Corporation does the job. On
the face of it, there might appear the no objectionable element in
such a policy, after all export credits help less developed countries
by providing extra foreign exchange. But at what cost? The credit
loans are extended at commercial rates, and, therefore, as in the
case of public loans at high interest rates they add to the debt-
burden on recipient countries. However, in the period 1960-1962,
only a few countries, Ghana, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are
known to have increased their debt burden through excessive
^Ministry of Overseas Development, Overseas Development;
The Work of the New Ministry, Cmnd. 2736 (August, 1965) Section 96,
p. 35 As Reproduced in Wolfgang G. Friedmann, et al. International
Financial Aid (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) p. 459*
^John Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics,
(Englewood, N. J., Prentice Hall, Inc. 1967) p. 89.
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commitments on export loans or credits from the United States. The
position seems to have changed during the last half of the 1960's.
As already stated above, the "debt-serving" problem expresses
itself through the need to re-schedule loan-payments. The best
example of such re-scheduling of payments is that connected with the
Export-Import Bank of the United States as revealed in hearings be¬
fore a Sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives Ninety-First Congress-Second Session. The follow¬
ing are the figures before the Sub-Committee: (See Table 4)
Although the figures involved are far from being colossal,
the main story behind them is a depressing one, especially in the
case of the countries of Latin America, Liberia, India, and Taiwan
which have re-scheduled various times, whatever that means - twice,
three times or ten times. And more so because, except for Taiwan,
these countries' economic development performances are far from
being satisfactory. It is a story of poor countries engaged in
the process of continually increasing their inability to meet their
loan commitments. But this is only half the story, what about
loans and credits of a similar nature from other countries like
West Germany? What is more surprising is that Mr. Kearns' plan
to the sub-committee for authority to grant more credits was based
on the notion that the scheme was a success; from the recipient's
point of view, I am sure, it can hardly be regarded as such. What
a naked display of donors' economic interests!
To put the issue into proper perspective, one may assert that
export credits and such other loans to less developed countries, if
undertaken extensively in the framework of bi-l#t«ralism in the
TABLE 4
RE-SCHEDULING OF LOAN OBLIGATIONS FROM INCEPTION
OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK TO JANUARY 31, 1970
Country Amount Re-Scheduled Date Re-Scheduling Authorized
Congo $ 200,000.00 April 17, 1967
Ethiopia 308,331.00 Dec. 27, 1967 and May 22, 1969
Liber i a 18,864,540.00 Various;most recent,March 31,1969
Sierra Leone 1 ,275,000.00 October 1, 1968
Total : Africa 20,747,871.00
China (Taiwan) 6,220,573.85 Various
India 8,232,670.00 Various;most recent, January 30,1969
Indonesia 30,599,419.69 August 17, 1967
14,043,365.52 September 5, 1968
Total; Asia 60,138,429.06
Finland 90,061,791.40 March 22, 1951
Greece 1,633,342.00 September 16, I965
Spai n 94,660.68 December 7, 1967
Yugosiavia 7,000,000.00 December 23, I965
Total: Europe 98,789,804.08
Argentina 84,408,328.51 Various;most recent,Oct. 10, 1968
6,638,772.05 Variousjmost recent, Dec. 23,1968
Bolivia 33,918,739.67 August 4, 1966
Brazi1 616,844,693.97 Variousjmost recent,June 25, 1964
Chile 89,176,066.74 Variousjmost recent,March 24,1969
Colombia 1,131,073.48 Variousjmost recent,June 13, 1966
Costa Rica 5,170,120.44 Variousjmost recent, Dec. 2, 1965
Dominican Repub 400,000.00 June 26, 1967
Ecuador 323,529.40 (No date given)
Hai ti 34,973,911.34 Variousjmost recent,July 20, I965
Mexico 4,000,000.00 May 25, 1964
Peru 130,000.00 November, 1964
Venezuela 2,689,551.00 Variousj most recent,May 2, 1968
Total:
Latin Arne ric a -879,905,786.60
Grand Total: $1 ,059,481,890.74
aid -giving process, could pause a serious problem, the increasing of
debt-burdens as already signaled by re-scheduling of U. S. export
^Henry Kearns, First Vice-President and Vice Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the U. S.: A Testi¬
mony before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives Nine-First Congress-Second Session. Foreign
Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971» p.llo.
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loans. A situation could arise where low-interest loans from
foreign governmental bodies and international organizations would
be used to repay the high interest loans from private or semi¬
government lenders in the more developed countries. Were this to
happen, the whole idea of aid, as we defined it, would have been
defeated. The likelihood of this happening has been used as one
of the strong arguments in support of the desirability of having




Until the middle of the 1960's, the traditional way of
offering economic aid to the less developed countries was through
the financing of physically identifiable projects. This was the
case whether aid was from donor governments or from international
organizations. This aid technique was adopted because of several
considerations. First, there was the notion that less developed
countries' methods of production remained backward because they
could not afford the foreign exchange cost of importing modern capi¬
tal goods from the more developed countries. Project financing was
needed as a sure means of breaking that bottleneck in the develop¬
ment process. Secondly, the donors wanted to ensure that capital
funds granted to the less developed countries were not dissipated
in lavish consumer expenditures at the neglect of activities the donors
regarded as strategically crucial for effecting economic development.
Those activities were the economic overheads, i.e. railroads, com¬
munications, irrigation schemes, etc. for which private capital
could not be readily available. It is only recently that interest
has been shown in social overheads, i.e. schools, hospitals, univer¬
sities, etc. This means of control was needed not only during con¬
struction, but also after completion. It was easier to maintain
some form of supervisory function on projects (to protect investment)
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than on unidentifiable activities, especially in the case of the
international organizations that had limited field staff. Thirdly,
economic overhead projects were specially attractive to foreign
development agencies because these are readily susceptible to analy¬
sis in terms of engineering feasibility and benefit-cost studies:
this was an important consideration because it enable donors to
select activities that maximized benefits while minimizing costs
(theoretically though). Furthermore, project assistance was attrac¬
tive because it made it possible for donors to offer help without
interfering in the day-to-day economic activities of the recipient
countries.
The project approach as a technique of aid-giving has led to
several developments most of which are to the disadvantage of the
less developed countries, and thus inimical to the economic develop¬
ment objective: (1) under the guise of limiting the impact of aid
on the balance of payments, donors instituted a system of "procure¬
ment tying," i.e. requiring recipients to purchase all their imports
under the loan from the loan giver. As already noted in Chapter II,
this has means, in essence, the transfer of capital goods from the
donor to the recipient without any foreign exchange transactions.
While there are instances when aid-tying has been, on the face of
is, regarded as inevitable, what is objectionable is that once
instituted, it is never lifted. It would, therefore, appear as if
the balance of payments argument (which calls for its introduction)
is a hoax. And more so, because "procurement tying" is being main¬
tained in disregard of the general philosophy of the General Agree¬
ment of Trade and Tariffs (GATT). That is, while other forms of
restrictive trade practices are outlawed (internationally) or at
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least discouraged, aid-tying has continued to be acceptable, at
least, to the more developed countries, the donors. This is a good
example of where donors' economic and commercial interests take
precedence over the overly publicized humanitarian aid-objective.
The less developed countries have (perhaps rightly so) branded this
as a clear expression that international rules are meant to circum¬
scribe only the activities of the weaker nations.
To the recipient countries, aid-tying, means buying from a
market which may be the dearest, in which case the value of aid
would be reduced. This happens where prices within the donor country
are non-competitive (thus allowing for the charging of monopolistic
prices) or where competitive prices within the donor country are
above the World competitive prices (the existence of oligopolistic
markets within donor countries makes this more than likely).^ Mike-
sell refers to a study by the World Bank, several years ago, which
investigated the problem of competitive bids on about forty contracts
for the procurement of equipment worth $190 million dollars. The
results were that "in more than half the cases, the lowest bid was
at least 35 percent cheaper than the highest and more than 20 per¬
cent below the average."^ This example illustrates how project
costs can be reduced by buying capital goods in openly competitive
markets. Furthermore, let us refer to another example of how "pro¬
curement tying; reduces the value of aid: . a farm institute was
built in Nyasaland for 48,000 pounds with untied 'Freedom from
Hunger' money. The institute had been previously fully explored by
^Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid. (Chicago;
The Aldine Publishing Compan7> 1968) p. 229.
^Ibid. p. 253.
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the A. I. D. Financed by them, the cost would have been 73jOOO
pounds with an A. I. D. contribution of 40,000 pounds."^ The
Malawi (Nyasaland) Case also illustrates how local resources in
the less developed countries are diverted to financing projects
whose costs are inflated by "procurement tying." Malawi would have
paid an extra 25,000 pounds in this respect. £ases such as this
one have invited the charge by some less developed countries that
donor countries have more to gain from aid than they.
Another problem associated with project aid in general and
"procurement tying," in particular, is that regarding aid administra¬
tion in the less developed countries. That it demands elaborate
administrative machinery from countries that are deficient in that
respect. The gist of this disadvantage is summed up in this quo¬
tation:
Even where there is only one donor involved, steps
have been taken to see that, for example, the contractor
imports his door-handles and light bulbs from the U.S.A.
- where there are many donors involved, the problem be¬
comes nightmarish. Imagine trying to build the Niger dam
from seven different tied loans (the U. K. offer of aid
will not be fully taken up in this case, and may not be
used at all - because the jigsaw puzzle cannot be solved!)
It makes things very difficult for contractors who have
to buy from sources they are not used to, and do not
know. Some of the smaller local contractors have felt
unable to tender for projects for this reason.^
It is apparent from this quotation, that tying, apart from being
highly demanding on administrative talent, discourages local
initiative. And that through the rigidity of its application, i.e.
^lan M. D. Little, Aid to Africa. (Oxford, London, Edinburgh,




foreign purchase of minute items, there must be situations where
locally available commodities have to brought from thousands of
miles across the oceans.
Strict adherence by donors to financing only the import costs
of projects has given rise to what has become known as the "home
problem" i.e., the domestic costs associated with foreign financed
projects and other complementary domestic schemes. This approach
has afforded the donors their desired intention of least involve¬
ment, though this attitude has been changing since 1963, in the
domestic problems of recipient countries. This approach (strict
adherence. ..) is also an expression of the rather questionable
donor theses as to the causes of lack of economic development in
the recipient countries: (a) that the shortage of foreign exchange
was the main bottleneck which hindered the importation of capital
goods, a lacking production-input in the less developed countries.
It is only recently that donors have realized the fact that lack
of development cannot be explained away by foreign exchange-shortage.
And (b) that recipient countries could only appreciate the importance,
for economic development, of foreign financed projects if they too,
had a stake in them. Therefore, the argument goes, it was vital
that they paid the domestic costs. . To require recipients to share
the cost of the projects is, indeed, sound development policy but,
the questionable element in the argument has been the lack of pre¬
cise knowledge if not lack of interest, on the part of the donors,
as to how much they (recipients) could comfortably afford.
The "home problem,” where it is acute, may present difficulties
to recipient countries. Namely, disproportionate amounts of domestic
funds may have to be tied up with foreign financed projects to the
neglect of other sections of the economy, some capital equipment
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may have to lie idle where recipients are unable to import spare
parts due to shortage of foreign exchange. India was in this cate¬
gory before she was rescued by an international consortium in 1963-64,^
and in certain cases recipients may be forced to embark on unsound
fiscal and monetary policies (by running large budget deficits to
finance recurrent expenditures) thus inducing inflation and economic
i n s t a b i 1 i t y .
It is important to note that the local costs problems have
been alleviated, though not eliminated, by the donors' (including
the World Bank, IRBD, since 1954) willingness to finance some of the
recurrent expenditures of projects or making arrangements for a pro¬
portion of the project loan to be paid in local currency. The Soviet
Union is known to have paid local project costs in Afghanistan in
1959, by providing for the importation of consumer goods from the
Soviet Union, which were subsequently sold for the required local
currency.
With all the competition among aid-donors, projects constructed
from each donor countries' assistance have served as a goodwi11-
earning symbol of its concern over the economic problems of the less
developed areas of the world. The communist bloc has been systematic
in its choice of projects with a political impact. For example,
the Soviet paving of the streets of Kabul, building of the Asian
2
Games Stadium in Indonesia, and a hotel in Burma. Currently, the
Chinese are involved in the programme for the construction of a
^Little and Clifford, International Aid. p. 228.
2
Leo Tansky, U. S. and U. S. S. R. Aid to Developing Countries.
p. 29
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railway between Tanzania and Zambia. The goodwill objective is no
small consideration even in the Western World. It seems to be one
of the bases for the continued existence of bi-lateral aid, and thus
an impediment to the multilateralization of all economic assistance.
The preference for projects by donors has led to a situation
where the more production of "credit-worthy" projects has become a
basis for granting economic assistance. There is no reason to doubt
that the submission of good projects is a manifestation of the
"capital absortive capacity" of the recipient countries, what is
questionable is whether this is always the best means of allocating
scarce resources. Too much reliance on this criterion has already
led to the overproduction of economic overheads in some of the less
developed countries; in Africa, for instance, such facilities as
power and roads (highways) have been provided well in advance of
demand (power from the Kariba Dam and Owen Falls in the former
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and in Uganda respectively).
This has been a form of waste of scarce economic resources. What
is often overlooked is the fact that economic overheads (let alone
overproduced ones) in the public sector cannot induce sufficient
demand for their product, a factor that is determined by the growth
of the other sectors of the economy.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that this preference for
projects by donors has helped to reinforce the craving ambitions of
some recipients for prestige investments like international air¬
ports, first class hotels, oi1-refineries, and such other so-called
symbols of modernity. To the extent that this has happened, the
bias toward projects has been accentuated. The resulting mis-
allocation of scarce resources has, no doubt (though difficult to
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measure) contributed to the retardation of the economic development
process.
The Program Approach
After many years of project based aid which appeared ineffective,
the donors have slowly become inclined toward more positive action
in the aid-giving process. That is, they have realized that lack of
development in the less developed countries cannot be solved by
shipping to those areas large amounts of capital goods even to the
point of excessive provision. It has become apparent that a closer
look at the development process at the recipient country level is
essential. So much so that involvement in the economic domestic
problems of recipients (though tradition frowns at it) has almost
been universally accepted as a necessary evil. The short-comings
of the project approach such as the "home problem" have been
acknowledged by donors, and measures taken to alleviate them. Since
1964, the World Bank (IRBD) has provided, where necessary, funds
to meet local costs of projects, it is now participating in agri¬
culture and education despite the low import content of the pro¬
jects; and its recent thinking is directed toward involvement in
tourism and family planning,^ - quite a remarkable departure from
tradition.
This trend away from inflexible project financing gave birth
to a new technique termed the program approach. Although, in
practice, there is sometimes no clear distinction between a program
and a project, the difference lies in the fact that program atKi
is, ideally, not directed to a particular project but toward the




financial requirements of the economy viewed as a whole. It is
(program aid) meant to fill the gap between total investment re¬
quirements and domestic contribution to the development effort, i.e.
the so-called investment gap. It is in order to note, in passing,
that the United States took a lead in using the program aid technique.
This she did even at the cost of being branded a neo-colonialist
country. However, the charge has not been without justification;
to say the least, because her motives or objectives, as outlined
in Chapter II, have hot been altogether nonselfish. Later on in
this section, special reference will be made to South America where
the United States has widely employed the program approach.
The adoption of the program approach as an aid-technique has
invoked a couple of implications: (1) it has become imperative
that donors have information relating to the overall quantitative
performance of each prospective recipient's economy, and (2) it has
high-lighted the seriousness of the "multi-donor" problem and the
necessity for establishing a multilateral aid-system.
Measurement of Performance
The need to evaluate the "aid-worthiness" of a country as a
whole aroused interest in the macro-economic analysis of economic
development. Raymond Mikesell refers to a number of variables which
the World Bank has regarded as pertinent to an adequate evaluation
of programs. These Are:
The volume of domestic saving, the volume and effectiveness
of total investment, internal price stability, balance of
payments equilibrium as determined by foreign exchange and
trade policies, the volume of pVivate investment and the
productivity of the private sector,the capacity to service
debts, and the formulation and implementation of good
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development plans.
The list is indeed exhaustive, but the crucial question is, are the
variables capable of precise measurement? The dearth of vital
statistics in the less developed countries makes that possibility
highly unlikely. Mikesell notes that "the criteria are too general
or imprecise to be used by loan officers in making decisions on
particular loans, or even for determining the level of lending over
a given period." And that for the same reasons aid recipients
did not seem to regard them as practicable. What he is saying in
plain language is that they are useless as tools of practical
policy.
Practical policy requires quantitative data with some pre¬
dictive value: estimates that will attempt to measure the increase
in the level of domestic savings and investments that should
accompany a proposed annual foreign-financed program or set of
projects in order for the project to be implemented, and make the
required contribution to growth and development, the increases in
government revenues that should accompany the annual aid-program
in order to avoid inflation, the increase in the rate of exports
growth required as a consequence of both the higher volume of in¬
vestment and output resulting from the program,and the increase in
the debt-serving capacity of recipients that would ensue.For the
most part, not until recently, no such estimates had been under¬
taken in respect of the less developed countries partly for the
^Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, p. I63.
^ I b i d.
^ I b i d.
44
reason already given, lack of reliable data in general and Sectoral
data in particular, and partly because there was lack of commitment
to the problem of development by both donor countries and interna¬
tional organizations. The result has been that program loans have
been based on assumed parameters as to the level of economic per¬
formance in the recipient countries. Assumed parameters in this
context have been no more than casual guesses.
It is only recently that the World Bank has shown a genuine
interest in applying its energies to the problem. It
. . .periodically sends economic missions to member countries
to assess their developmental progress and problems, and
their economic problems. These assessments include analy¬
sis of government's fiscal and investment policies, their
development planning, the achievement of plan targets,
the pattern of public expenditures, the uses to which
external assistance is put, the mobilization and alloca¬
tion of available domestic resources, the effectiveness
of foreign trade and investment policies, of institution¬
building programs, and so on. The Bank may suggest policy
changes to the government in the light of its findings, which
are intended to provide the Bank and the borrower country
with a blueprint for the orderly, and coordinated overall
development of the borrower's economy.^
This is an optimistic note in the field of international
economic aid but, taken in the context of a predominantly bilateral
and unco-ordinated system, it means very little. It is only appli¬
cable, with full force, to 10 percent or less of total aid, the
multilateral component. Whatever objections may be raised against
the quality of the macro-economic analyses that are generally used
as tools of economic-aid-policy, the salient point about the pro¬
gram approach is that it is a look in the right direction.




A brief review of how the United States' program assistance
to the Latin American countries has progressed is now in order.
The U. S. A. development policy to the Latin American countries has
most of the ingredients of a policy that could provide a break¬
through in the field of aid-giving. Through the Inter-American
Committee of the Alliance, formed in 1964, the U. S. A. has made
the Latin American countries commit themselves to a 5 percent
annual growth rate of their Gross Domestic Product. The U. S. A.,
on its part, has promised to assist those countries to achieve that
objective, on condition that they made serious effort toward
helping themselves (through appropriate economic reform measures
such as agreed upon budgetary and monetary control, and foreign
exchange policies).' Unsatisfactory performance has entailed the
suspension of aid. For instance, disbursements under the 1963
program loan to Brazil were suspended in 1964, though temporarily
until the change of government, and those on a loan to Colombia
2
were with-held in 1965»
However, the cases of aid suspension are only part of the
story. There are instances where non-compliance has not led to aid
suspension because of the U. S. A.'s fear of unfavorable political
repercussions. This fear is well illustrated in this quotation;
. . . Imagine the uproar, hostility, and friction that
could be generated by a U. S. decision to apply sanction!
The truth about the fine print would never catch up with
the howls of 'imperialism' and 'intervention.' . . .
'tittle and Clifford, International Aid, p. 263.
2
Agency for Initernati onal Development; (AID) I966, p.53 as
Quoted in Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid p. I76.
In short, the political fiasco which could result from
a U. S. decision to terminate aid acts as an effective
brake upon the U. S. taking that step. This fact can
hardly have escaped the attention of the shrewd
officials in the recipient countries.
To the extent that such instances (fear to suspend aid) have been
many, one may be forced to conclude that the potential of the U. S.
program approach to that area have, perhaps, been considerably
undermined. This U. S. program approach in Latin America (although
it may be too early to conclude that it has failed) has made perti-
neht the fears of other donor countries as to the diplomatic or
political wisdom of too much involvement in the domestic affairs of
recipient countries, especially where the donor tries to super¬
impose its own values over those of another ,political 1y independent
country.
The Focus on the Multi-Donor Problem
It is, perhaps, not surprising that the change in the atti¬
tude of donors toward a policy of involvement in the recipient's
domestic problems has gradually lent support to the need for greater
co-ordination of donor effort. The reason is that involvement has
made them realize the economic waste and the hardships that befall
recipient countries because of donor competition. The hardships
include among other things the di sadvarLtages of project aid and
the "procurement tying" to which vie have already referred in section
1 of this chapter. The realized need to co-ordinate international
aid has expressed itself in the demand that a good part of the
^U. S. Senate Sub-Committee Report, "United States Foreign
Aid in Action: A Cas6 Study." Committee of Government Operations,
1966. p. 178.
47
system should be multi-1ateralized. That the international organi¬
zations like the World Bank and the United Nations Agencies should
handle that task, or where necessary, new ones should be formed.
But there have been snage that have retarded the move. First,
the Sino-Soviet bloc has not shared in the change of attitude (at
least to any appreciable extent), a manifestation of the premium
they put on the political objective of economic aid; that objective
would, of course, be undermined if much of the aid were channeled
through multi-lateral organizations. Their intransigence has been
given as one of the main reasons why the Western donors' (the OECD
countries) move toward multilateral aid has been rather cautious.
An expression of the fear that the Communists would reap all the
political benefits, associated with bilateral aid, to the detriment
of the ideals of the Western World. The other main reason for
cautious move, of course, has been the dis-i11usionment in donor
countries about the whole idea of international aid. We shall
refer to this aspect in detail on the chapter dealing with the
future of an international aid system. It will suffice to close
this section by noting that because of the snags just referred to,
international cooperation in the aid-giving process has mostly been
limited and strongest during crisis periods like that of India in
1963-64 which induced the formation of an international aid cen¬
sor ti urn.
An Evaluation of the Two Approaches
An evaluation of the program and project approaches to
economic aid can be initiated by asking the simple question: which
of the two approaches to economic aid is more conducive to economic
development? And since the former started as a reaction against
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the shortcomings of the latter, one may be tempted to answer the
question in the favor of the former. But, the answer to the
question is not as simple as that. It may be true in a particular
instance but, it may not always be so. What are the facts? The
main difference between the two is that while program aid is meant
to supplement domestic investment efforts in the macro-economic
sense, i.e. filling the "investment gap," project aid is directed
toward physically identifiable projects. So that while program
aid can be used to finance local developmental costs, project aid,
strictly interpreted,cannot. But when the former is supplemented
by funds to cover the local costs of projects that distinction be¬
tween the two becomes a matter of semantics.
The question as to which of the two is favorable to economic
development is best answered by the following quotation:
While the project system has much to commend it when the
main focus is on increasing the country's ability to in¬
vest, it becomes increasingly inappropriate as the
development process gets under way. As the rate of growth
increases, . . . the effectiveness of aid depends more
on the use that is made of the additional output than on
the efficiency with which a limited fraction of invest¬
ment is carried out .... Limiting the form of assistance
to machinery and equipment needed by substantial invest¬
ment projects is likely to lower the rate of growth or
to distort the pattern of investment .... The strong¬
est argument for the program approach arises for countries,
. . . where balance of payments is the main factor limit¬
ing growth and there is typically excess capacity in a
number of productive sectors. In this situation, the
highest priority of imports is for raw materials and
spare parts to make more effective use of existing capaci¬
ty.’
In short, one cannot determine which of the two approaches is
Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance
and Economic Development." The American Economic Review. Vol.
LVI (September, 1966) No. 4 Part 1, pp. 727-728.
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conducive to economic development - one has to know the stage of
development or the nature of the problem in the country in question.
The Chenery-Strout exposition puts a special premium on the
importance of research into the true nature of the developmental
problems in the individual less developed countries. It explains
why a global application of theoretical models or formulations of
whatever approach has little chance of success, unless based on
sound empirical research. It is in this frame of mind that the
World Bank approach (already referred) of sending periodic
economic missions to the less developed countries is the one
approach to be highly appreciated. It is only unfortunately thfet
its efforts are but a drop of water in the vast ocean.
CHAPTER IV
THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMIC AID SYSTEM
Of all the aspects of the economic aid-system, the one con¬
cerning its future is, perhaps, the most challenging. With the
system being subjected to various strains and stresses, naturally,
it is an interesting exercise to speculate as to what is likely to
happen. The problem may be examined from two angles, (1) the
idealistic and (2) the realistic.
The Idealistic Angle
From an idealistic viewpoint, the system of transferring
resources from the more developed areas to the less developed
countries has failed to induce rapid development in the latter.
It has failed because of its predominately bilateral nature. To
this school of thought a multi-1ateral-aid-system is the most
satisfactory for accomplishing the economic development objective.
Multilateralism in this respect would entail avoiding, internation¬
ally, all bilateral public (government) aid. It would also include
international control of export credits to the less developed
countries. As was indicated in Table 4, export-credits have con¬
tributed to the debt-serving problems of the recipient countries.
All economic and technical aid would tend to be channeled through
international agencies; namely, the World Bank and its affiliates
the International Development Association and the International
Finance Corporation, and the United Nations and its related agencies.
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such as the United Nations Special Fund (UNSF), the Agriculture and
Food Organization (FAO), etc.
Such a system, the argument continue, would have a number of
advantages, some of which are as follows: (1) aid would be freed
from the political and economic interests of the donor-countries;
and would thus eliminate the recipients' often repeated charge
that donors gain more from aid than they do - which attitude has
tended to stifle their receptivity to advice from donor countries;
(2) the anonymity multilateral agencies makes them better placed
to enforce aid terms, including withdrawal of aid where recipients'
performance is unsatisfactory, without being suspected of neo¬
colonist intentions; (3) it would put an end to the economically
wasteful competition in aid-giving. For instance, technical assist
ance could be more effective in increasing the "capital-absortive-
capacity" of recipient economics if administered on a uniform basis
That recipients have encountered numerous difficulties because of
accepting technical aid from different sources, i.e. from Western
donors and from the Sino-Soviet bloc, thus entailing training of
locals in two types of technology and language problems; (4) a
multilateral system would render "procurement .tying" unnecessary,
where it has been necessary because of balance of payments problem;
and (5) there is also an optimistic view that an integrated system
would be favorable to more concentration in research with the aim
of discovering the most suitable methods of production for use in
the less developed countries. That the fault in the traditional
system is that it has involved transplanting production methods
of the donors in the less developed countries without adequate
adaptation. The situation in the less developed countries.
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continues the argument, needs labor-intensive methods of production
in order to absorb labor surpluses and also conserve foreign
exchange, since simpler labor intensive methods would require a
small amount of imports.
While the ideal viewpoint may be based on a number of sound
arguments, it also overlooks a number of important facts. First,
the notion that the economic aid system has been an unqualified
failure is an understatement. It cannot be regarded as an unquali¬
fied success either, but that is a different matter. There is
documentary evidence to show signs of success: (1) economic aid
has enabled Greece, Israel, and Taiwan to graduate from the less
developed group to the more developed group of countries, (2) the
United Nations gross national products 5 percent annual growth rate
target for the first Development Decade was achieved (though with
notable qualifications).^ On the same point of GNP growth rates,
Robert E. Asher, basing his calculations on OECD figures gives the
following annual growth rates for seventy-six countries for the
period 1960-67; ten countries (Honk Kong, Iran, Israel, Jordan,
Nicaragua, Panama, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Thailand) had
7 percent or better, five (El Salvador, Iraq, Mexico, Peru, and
Trinidad and Tobago) had between 6 and 7 percent, twenty-five had
2
between 4-6 percent, and 35 fell below the 4 percent mark. His
Robert S. McNamara, "International Economic Development."
New York: An Address to the University of Colombia Conference.
(February 2^^ 1970) p.7.
2
Robert E. Asher, "Foreign Aid:" Monthly Labor Review
November, 1969) p. 23-30.
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conclusion is that aid "works" because the recipients who received
the largest amounts had higher growth rates. (See Tables 1 and
2). Asher, of course, noted that the GNP per capita growth rates
had been less impressive; .9 percent for Africa; 1.7 percent for
Latin America and 2.6 percent for Asia. The third sign of success
overlooked by the idealist is that, even where annual growth rates
of Gross National Products have not been spectacular, economic
assistance has been helpful in building up a modern economic in¬
frastructure .
Secondly, the idealistic view overlooks the fact that the
Sino-Soviet bloc has never accepted, in principle, the administra¬
tion of economic aid by the United Nations or any of its agencies
or by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank) and its affiliates, the International Development
Association and the International Finance Corporation. They have
always regarded economic aid as a means of maximizing national
political objectives, and thus will always like to remain bilateral
And as long as that is the case (the Western donors countries),
the United States for one, cannot be persuaded to unilaterally
abandon, so to speak, bilateral aid. They would regard that as
virtual surrender to the "Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive." Thirdly
some Western donor countries are just as committed to bilateral
arrangements as Communists. For instance, a country like France
is committed under the auspices of the France area; she has not
shown appreciable signs of sacrificing much of her commercial
interests for the non-tangible benefits (from her own angle) of the
multi1ateral-aid concept.
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Fourthly, and most important, the idealists ignore the
observed lack of interest and disillusionment about the whole idea
of aid, multilateral aid, that exists in the Western donor countries.
For instance, despite the incessant pleas for the economic desira¬
bility of a multi1ateral-aid-system, figures remain (at least until
1965) with no marked decrease in bilateral aid on one hand and an
increase in multilateral aid on the other. Everett E. Hagen in
1968, prepared a table showing the flow of long term resources
from the more developed countries to the less developed countries
and multilateral agencies for the period 1956-1965. That table
is reproduced as Table 5 to illustrate the points just made in the
two previous sentences.
TABLE 5
THE FLOW OF LONG-TERM RESOURCES TO LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES AND MULTILATERAL AGENCIES, 1956-65^
Disbursements in Millions of U. S. Dollars and Percentages
A1 1 DAC Countries 1956 1957 1958 1959 1 960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
1 . Total 6,261 7,644 7,315 7,164 8,096.5 9,315.9 8,576.9 8,664.6 9,180.0 10,443
2. Official Resour 3,289 3,879 4,419 4,398 4,936.5 6,054.4 5,989.9 6,086.2 5,871 .0 6,209
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^Everett E. Hagen, The Economics of Development. (Homehood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968)












Disbursements in Millions of U. S. Dollars and Percentages
Private Capital 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
9. Direct Investment
net 2,230 2,491 1 ,860 1 ,625
^ Portfolio,and
other 285 798 828 768
11. Export Cr.,net 457 476 209 374
12. Si no-Soviet bloc 107 87 205 161




DAC • • • • • t • • •
14. Official Resources:
U.A. ... • • • • • • • • • •
15« Private Capital
DAC • • • • • • • • •
16. Private Cap:U.S. ... • • • • • • • • •
1,740.7 1,839.2 1,469.1 1 ,659.2 1,818.4 2,535.8
849.4 723.7 460.2 252.4 550.2 873.1
570.9 698.6 657.9 668.8 940.4 824.9
1 86 294 391 425 350?* 350?*
• • • .64 .59 .56 .49 • CO
• • • .66 .63 .63 .55 .53
• • • .35 .25 .24 .28 .33
• • • .21 .15 .15 .21 .28
*No precise or even approximate data are available. Gross disbursements are estimated at not more
than $500 million per year in 1964 and I965. Repayments obligations had risen to perhaps $200 million
per year in I965. U. S. Dept, of State Research Memoranda RSB-50, June 17, I966, and RSB-80, July 21, I967.
Source; Lines, 1,2,4,6,8,9>10,11, 1956-65: OECD, 1967> Table A.l.Line7: Ibid Table A.9. Lines, 3>5: Com
puted from Ibid., Tables II 3 and II 7 respectively, and A.L. Lines 1,2,4, I967, Flow, Table II.3
and II.7 and estimates of DAC members' GNP in own currency converted to U. S. dollars by use of
official foreign exchange rates. GNP data and exchange rates from International Financial
Statistics.
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In Table 5> DAC (Development Assistance Committee)countries
refers to OECD countries; official resources is the total amount of
bilateral and multilateral public aid; and figures in brackets under
lines 6 and 8 are my own computation from table figures, they are
ratios, in percent, of bilateral aid and multilateral aid to total
official aid respectively.
Looking at the figures for multi1ateral,bi1ateral, and Sino-
Soviet aid for the period 1956-65, we can observe the following
trend: the multilateral share increase (except for the two years
1958 and 1959) from 6.9 percent in 1956 to a peak of 12.7 percent
in 1961; since I96I, the story has been that of either decline or
very slight increase, but never reaching the I96I peak or even
approaching it. It fell to a low of 6.0 percent in 1963, then rose
slightly to 6.5 percent in 1964, and 7.1 percent in 1965* The per¬
centage figures for bilateral aid, logically, depict an opposite trend,
since they are the differences between the total 100 percent and
multilateral percentages. Bilateral and percentages remained at
the 90 percent mark from 1956 to 1959, fell to the 80 percent mark
in i960 and I96I, and since 1962 they have remained at the 90 per¬
cent mark. The Sino-Soviet bloc aid, which is also a form of
bilateral aid, increased, except for the year 1957, from 107 million
in 1956 to 425 in I963. For the 1964-65 period for which figures
are unavailable, it would not be too optimistic to assume that the
amount for each year would be above the 1963 figure, and more so
with the competition between Russia and China, the Chinese are
showing a keen interest in aid, for political reasons of course.
The story told by the figures above is no encouragement to
the idealistic view point. Multilateral aid percentages have
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remained low after I96I despite the fact that that was the period
of the first Development Decade, during which period positive
efforts were undertaken to encourage more channeling of aid through
multilateral arrangements; the bilateral share increased instead.
It is also interesting to note that total aid was rising from 1956
and reached a peak in I96I, and since I96I to 1965» it was declining
(except for the 1965 amount which was boosted up by a rise in private
capital). It would seem that multilateral aid fared better as long
as total aid was rising and worse, when it was falling. In short,
the figures illustrate that bilateral arrangements are the mainstay
of the economic aid system, abolishing it would put in the balance
the future of the whole scheme, if not put it to an end.
The other point illustrating di si 1 1 usli.onment with aid in
general in the western countries is the general decline in the ratio
of public aid (bilateral and multilateral) to the gross national
products of the DAC countries as a group, and the ratio:, of U. S. A.
aid to the gross national product. The former fell from .64 per¬
cent In 1961 to .48 percent in I965, and the latter, .66 percent to
•53 percent in I965. It is worth noting that the U. S. A. percentage
had dropped to .38 percent in 1968 (an indication that disillusion¬
ment continues to deepen).' Jacob J. Kaplan in 1967> commenting
on the cause of disillusionment in the United States said it was
evidence of what he called "the fallacy of the economic development
diplomacy." The notion that developed countries should grant aid
^
Time, October 10, 1969» p. 4l.
2
Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid. (New York,
Washington, London; Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, I967), p* 101.
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only in the pursuit of the humanitarian objective. For all prac¬
tical purposes, therefore, the ideal type of a multilateral aid
system is a non-starter.
The Realistic Viewpoint
Since the main weakness of the international economic-aid-
system is lack of coordination, and since the ideal solution has
been dismissed as a non-starter, less ideal alternatives have to
be considered. The whole thing, of course, amounts to making
modifications to the existing system that will retain the predominance
of bilateral arrangements. In fact, there is no logical reason
why coordination of aid should require the abolition of bilateralism.
Lester Pearson, former Premier of Canada and Chairman of the 1968
Commission on International Development (Pearson Commission) shares
a similar view that as it is expressed in the previous sentence.
Speaking on the need to coordinate international economic aid through-
turning more of it to multilateral organizations like the Internation¬
al Development Association, he had this to say about bilateral aid;
This does not mean any diminition in bilateral aid. In¬
deed, our recommendations would result in two-thirds of
the increased flow going through bilateral channels.^
Several suggestions have been advanced by various writers in
the field, we not turn to a detailed and critical examination of
some of them. One idea is that donor-controlled multilateral organi¬
zations should be established in recipient countries. That such
bodies would take over the functions that are performed by individual
donor organizations like the United States' Agency for International
Development (AID) and U. K.'s Middle East Development Division. And
^Extracts from Lester Pearson's Address to the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. UNESCO Courier (February, 1970)
p.l2.
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more important, that these new organizations would coordinate the
activities of the donors in cooperation with the recipients and the
United Nations regional missions where they exist. Among the spe¬
cific functions they would do would be the following: assist re¬
cipients in the preparation of sound economic development plans
and policies, provide technical assistance, and also general-aid-
supervision. The practicability of this idea, the Little and Clifford
(1966), the argument continues,has been confirmed by the cooperation
between AID and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) to
financing the Nairobi water supply scheme, and the international
cooperation through the formation of conrostia and consultative
groups run by the World Bank (IBRD), OECD, and the DAC. That such
bodies (the ones just mentioned) could form the basis for the donor-
controlled multilateral organizations.^
Mikesell (1968), while in full agreement with the Little-Clifford
argument on the question of the establishment of donor controlled
organizations, attacks the inference that World Bank, etc., run con¬
sortia and consultative groups would form the bases of the envisaged
bodies. He regards them as not satisfactory because these are con¬
cerned only with "the general approval of an annual external aid
budget and on agreement as to what financing will be provided by
each agency."^ That what was needed were donor representative bodies
that would have a "day-to-day contract" with officials of the




have as one of their functions the coordination of "soft-loans"
with the activities of conventional loan agencies. He contends that
much of the aid from concessionary assistance agencies like the AID
and the IDA is, under the existing system, going toward paying hard
loan repayments where recipients are faced with debt servicing problems
(due to over-borrowing on hard terms).
An international-aid system envisaged by both Little and Clifford
and Mi Resell would embrace most of the advantages of the ideal system
described in the previous section while retaining, at the same time,
the crucial bilateral element. Objections to such a system might,
understandably, come from recipient countries who might regard the
new organizations as donor clubs designed to exploit them. To this
charge the Communists would give their support. But the opposition
of recipients, were it to arise, would, no doubt, die down if the
system became effective economic development-wise. The Communist
bloc's opposition could be minimized by basing the donor-controlled
organization not on the NATO framework but on that of the World Bank.
The former has unfavorable political implications. This could be
done, especially, where the cooperation of the Communists were most
desired.
One other Little-Clifford suggestion is that recipient controlled
multilateral organizations should be formed. These would engage in
planning of development plans and projects, and all the other develop¬
ment problems including the negotiating of aid terms with donor
countries. That this would enhance their bargaining position and
minimize the chances of being exploited by individual capital exporting
bodies, particularly those dealing in hard-loans. The notion is that
the Latin American experience proved the feasibility of such an
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economic aid system. In Latin America, recipient controlled
multilateral bodies (two types) have been set up. There is the basic
aid machinery, the Inter-American Economic Aid and Social Council and
the Inter-American Development Bank. There are, in addition, special
committees like the Panel of Nine and Inter-American Committee of the
Alliance for Progress. The former committee evaluates plans drawn
up by Latin American Developments and reports on them to the govern¬
ments concerned, to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to
AID, and to any other agency intending to finance the plan. The latter
committee studies aid requirements and then makes recommendations on
the distribution of aid among the member states.
A world-wide aid system based on the Latin American experience
would enhance the self-help criterion, which is now regarded as vital
for the success of any development aid programme. But, these are dis¬
advantages. Its success would depend on the cooperation of donors.
That is, they would have to accept it, and also to agree to channel
all their aid through it. The system would, therefore, require some
coordination at the donor level. The second disadvantage is that the
system requires a lot of local administrative talent (as seen from the
Latin American experience), a factor that is considerably scarce in
many countries, particularly those in Africa. De$pite these dis¬
advantages, it is interesting to tell that the Latin American experi¬
ment has been transmitted to Africa and Asia where, through the
encouragement of the World Bank, the African Development Bank and
Asian Development Bank were formed in 1964 and 1965 respectively. It
is hoped that these banks will form the base of recipient controlled
multilateral organizations in the respective continents.
It has also been suggested that, if formal organizations either
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donor or recipient controlled or both, cannot be formed,at least,
consultative meetings between recipients and aid administrations in
the field should be encouraged. But it is also noted that such
meetings have foundered on administrative difficulties where they have
been tried, namely, in Jordan and Thailand.'
2
The final suggestion is Jacob Kaplan's three-point plan: (1)
that the United Nations should take over the administration of all
technical assistance programs. The reason being that it has the
most qualified staff and that it has (through its agencies) proved
its efficiency in that field over the years, (2) that the World Bank
should assume responsibility for all capital assistance (i.e. con¬
ventional international long term loans). That the World Bank had
done excellent work in the field of project assistance. Its reputa¬
tion for choosing good projects for support is supported by the fact
that it has not incurred a single bad debt,^ (3) that soft-loans and
grants from donor countries should remain bilateral. The reasons are:
first, Kaplan claims that soft-loan international agencies like IDA
have failed to ensure that aid was not used to finance non-economic
ventures, like indirectly subsidizing of war budgets as happened in
Malaysia in 1965> on the grounds that they are not allowed to interfere
in the internal affairs of recipient countries. The second point is
that donor countries need the leverage effect of concessionary loans
in the^ir pursuit of national political and security interests, which,




World Bank, "100 Q,uestions and Answers," (March, 1970) p. 59-
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aid. The third point is that donor countries would vote more funds
for soft-loans and grants if they knew that they had the power to with¬
hold funds when recipients pursued policies contrary to their national
interests. This point taken in the context of the downward trend in
the U. S. A. bilateral aid is the least convincing. There is also
no guarantee in Kaplan's proposal against the economic waste that
would ensue if donor governments, irrespective of economic performance,
directed most of the concessionary assistance to puppet governments in
the less developed countries. The use of AID economic development
funds in Laos (since 19^2) by the Central Intelligence Agency is a
case in point.
The first two of Kaplan's suggestions are, indeed, highly imagi¬
native. The first would eliminate problems, in the less developed
countries, associated with training of local personnel in eastern and
western technologies. It would also expose the recipients to uniform
advice based on politically unbiased expertise. The second, unfortu¬
nately, would not improve the present set up because it would definite¬
ly, not encompass export-credits and private loans which are observed
to be aggravating the debt-serving problems of the less developed
countries. In the present international situation, with the Communists
unwilling to cooperate in international efforts of the type described
above, Kaplan's suggestions may be regarded as verging on the idealistic
side.
The conclusions that may be drawn from this critical study of the
international economic aid system are; (1) that the donor countries'
involvement in economic aid to the less developed countries has been
largely motivated by the political or national security interests, a
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fact demonstrated in the origin and execution of aid programmes,
(2)that the attempt to push the humanitarian objective over and above
the political interests of donor countries (a trend noticeable since
the early 1960's with the start of the first Development Decade) has
had the unfortunate effect of inducing general disillusionment about
the whole concept of economic aid, a point clearly indicated in
Table 5> (3) that the economic interests of donor countries, as
expressed in increased export credits and private loans to the less
developed countries, are aggravating the debt-servicing problems of
the recipients, and that, if carried to their logical limit, would
defeat the whole purpose of aid by compelling the use of proceeds
from soft-loans to repay part of the hard-loans, and (4) that the
only hope for the system lies in the coordination of the activities of
the donors on one side, and the proper organization (through multi¬
lateral recipient controlled bodies) of self-help programs in the
recipient countries on the other. Coordination in this context does
not refer to the idealistic form,(i.e.) full multi1aterialism, which
has no chance of succeeding. It is the realistic one that will
acknowledge the dominant role of bilateral interests.
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